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 2 
Introduction 
Few areas of research in political science are as nuanced and multifaceted as the 
politics of strategic generosity. Foreign aid, also commonly called international 
development aid or some close variation, occupies a unique place in the international 
political sphere because its essence springs from benevolence and a willingness to 
sacrifice in order to help others. These noble intentions usually take a backseat to strategy 
and power interests in most political interactions. However, since World War II, foreign 
aid practices have evolved and become densely packed with political strategy. The idea 
of foreign aid may have begun as true-intentioned benevolence, but the real world 
application of it has acquired a strategic dimension that is now an indispensible foreign 
policy tool for powerful governments. The different ways in which governments provide 
aid give insight into the policy preferences of those in power. Studying these methods 
allows citizens to choose their leaders more wisely. 
The United States has occupied a preeminent place in world politics since the end 
of WWII, being almost universally recognized as the number one military, cultural and, 
most of all, economic influence. Wartime success in Europe, new found respect for 
Americans around the globe and the subsequent rebuilding of the Western world allowed 
American leaders to shape the New World economy to their liking, often putting in place 
many mechanisms to enhance American hegemony. As a result, the US economy has 
grown at a rate that no other country could match, consequently endowing the American 
government with a budget many times larger than that of any other advanced, 
industrialized nation.  
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So what do these huge budgets mean for US foreign development policy? From a 
fiscal perspective, it means that the US could continue to provide the same amount of 
foreign aid at a steadily decreasing percentage of the national budget as the American 
economy grew. Historical data show a similar pattern. While the aid budget has grown in 
dollar value since the 1960s, aid as a percentage of the total budget has dropped 
significantly over the same period. However, even though foreign aid has lost standing in 
American policy according to the ratios, economic dominance allows the United States to 
still give more aid in hard cash than any other country on Earth.  
That fact is what prompted the writing of the current paper and should jar the 
American citizenry into realizing the unparalleled influence their leaders possess.  
If the United States is still giving the most aid in hard cash at a percentage of its 
budget well below the average among rich countries, American citizens clearly have a 
greater obligation to understand the aid policy preferences of American leaders than 
citizens of other countries do of their leadership. The fact that most Americans (in a 
recent CNN poll) think the US 
government spends 25% of its 
budget on foreign aid (when it 
actually spends less than 1%) 
underscores this obligation. (see 
Figure 1) More money in the US 
budget may be spent on domestic 
endeavors, but the effects of the roughly 0.6% put towards foreign aid reach millions, 
sometimes billions, more people than any other expenditure.  
Figure 1 
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There are two methods of aid distribution commonly used by donor governments: 
multilateral channels and bilateral channels. A multilateral agreement is transacted 
through a third party, such as the UN, and it describes an exchange with much more 
separation between donor and recipient in terms of direct interaction, control over where 
the aid goes and building a political relationship. A bilateral arrangement is more or less a 
direct agreement between two governments, which often includes conditions imposed by 
the donor that must be met in order for the funds to be transferred to the recipient 
government. This process naturally makes bilateral aid much more strategically oriented, 
since there exists an easy mechanism for donors to enforce conditionality. Although these 
two methods both disburse aid to those in need, they do so with differing levels of 
success and reflect different policy strategies. In the United States, partisan ideology can 
have a huge influence on the policy preferences of elected officials and effect changes in 
aid practices over time.  
Inspired by the difference in language used by each party when discussing 
international engagement, the instincts of American voters and the nature of American 
political discourse, this paper will test the following hypotheses: 
1. Multilateral aid practices tend to increase under Democratic governments 
2. The foreign aid budget tends to increase under Democratic governments 
The task of truly understanding policy preferences on a fundamental level is very 
difficult, however analyzing political parties, instead of individuals, can greatly simplify 
the task. Luckily for this paper, the American political system is neatly divided into two 
major parties, Democrats and Republicans, which roughly represent the two ends on the 
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spectrum of American political ideology. In an attempt to simplify the impossibly 
complicated, this paper assumes the two parties to represent baskets of policy preferences 
common to their respective constituents. As Gomberg, et al. wrote in 2004, “The parties 
function as aggregators of preferences of the population and they present well-defined 
platforms for the general vote. […] Preferences (ideology) of each party are determined, 
according to some fixed aggregation rule, by the preferences of its members” (pg 374). It 
is the goal of this paper to identify what effects partisan ideology has on foreign aid 
policy. Armed with this knowledge, the American citizenry can be one step closer to the 
ideal “educated voter.” 
 
*     *     * 
 
Literature Review 
Foreign Aid Redefined 
To familiarize oneself with the appropriate groundwork concerning this project, it 
is best to start with foreign aid literature and then work back into theory on policy 
preferences. The logical first question then becomes what is foreign aid? What exactly 
does a donor give to a recipient in an aid exchange? A useful approach to this question is 
not to look at the innumerable material manifestations of foreign aid, but at what that aid 
represents. An important distinction made by Hattori (2001) is that “foreign aid is a 
voluntary practice of donor states, whereas welfare is a right of citizens” (pg 636). This 
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statement implies that 
governments only 
provide foreign aid 
when they can spare it, 
much like an individual 
will only give to charity if they have enough funds to support their own life. These 
unreciprocated acts of charity give the power relationship between donor and recipient a 
hierarchical character, as opposed to the other types of giving shown in Figure 2. Hattori 
identifies foreign aid donations as acts of symbolic domination, in that the donor occupies 
a position of power over the recipient because the donor is providing what the recipient 
needs to survive. The idea of symbolic domination sheds important light on the topic of 
this paper because it redefines the foreign aid relationship as a power relationship and an 
active influence in affirming social relations between countries. 
The strategies that governments utilize in order to strengthen this symbolic 
domination often differ in what channels are used to disburse aid. As mentioned 
previously, the two main aid channels are bilateralism and multilateralism. These two 
means of giving have only coexisted in widespread practice since the early 1960s; 
bilateralism was the traditional means of foreign aid disbursal previously (Hattori, 2001; 
Milner, 2006).  
 
 
 
Figure 2; taken from Hattori (2001) 
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The Rise of Multilateralism 
Over the mid-20th century, the world entered an unprecedented era of 
internationalism spurred by the widespread destruction wrought by World War II. The 
World Bank had sprung into existence to help finance the reconstruction of crippled 
European states; the United Nations had been created and gained the support of the 
world’s most powerful governments; countless treaties were signed to prevent the horrors 
of world war from gripping the planet again; and, a new environment of the top reaching 
down to help the bottom was born. Once the wounds of WWII had scarred over, these 
new institutions suddenly found themselves without purpose, so they naturally turned to 
other projects. For example, the World Bank established a new branch called the 
International Development Association (IDA), which aggregates foreign aid donations 
from rich countries and administers development projects in poor countries; or, United 
Nation peace-keeping missions, which began as weak cease fire agreements, have 
evolved and now sometimes employ militarized action without the consent of the 
involved parties. These new institutions are manifestations of an environment of 
internationalism that has grown throughout the 20th century.  
Thus a new collection of international organizations was created and has since 
evolved to play its own significant role free from the influence of domestic governments. 
These institutions are what facilitate multilateral foreign aid giving. Figure 3 (on the next 
page) illustrates the growth of multilateral practices among members of the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) since the mid-1960s. The DAC is a panel of 24 “rich” countries 
that have agreed to aggregate a portion of their foreign aid budgets and goals. 
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When a donor country decides to give a portion of its aid through a multilateral 
agency, it relinquishes most, if not all control over where the aid goes, who gets to use it, 
and for what purpose. Therefore the strategic value of aid is greatly reduced by nature of 
the multilateral 
transaction since 
donor governments 
have limited power 
to enforce any kind 
of conditionality 
(Hattori, 2001). 
While this may be 
undesirable to donor governments, many scholars believe that multilateralism is more 
beneficial for recipients than bilateralism because the process naturally improves the 
quality of aid. (Milner, 2006; Balogh, 1967; Skidmore, 2012) 
Milner (2006) argues for two main reasons why multilateralism is a better method 
of aid disbursement for recipients than traditional bilateralism: 1) information provision, 
and 2) a decrease in politicization. The multilateral process is better suited for 
information provision, she writes, because of a collective action problem that exists 
among donor governments in gathering information about recipients. Multilateral 
institutions aimed at facilitating development funding will be better equipped to collect 
and provide region specific information – information that improves the quality of aid – 
than any individual government. Also, interactions between multilateral agencies, which 
can be said to represent “global interests”, and recipient countries are much less 
Figure 3; taken from Hattori (2001) 
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politicized than interactions between donor and recipient governments. This means the 
parties involved are more likely to cooperate because their interests are aligned or non-
conflicting, which allows the multilateral agency to enforce conditionality more 
effectively than an individual donor country could. 
However, multilateralism is not always a better method of aid disbursement than 
bilateralism; there are certainly instances where a direct agreement is more efficient and 
beneficial for the recipient country. For example, bilateral aid agreements between 
neighboring states are often better than multilateral arrangements because the two 
countries are already familiar with the political and cultural environment of their 
neighbor. The problem of information provision identified by Milner is solved by virtue 
of their proximity to each other. Furthermore, the aid would also contribute to 
strengthening political relationships, which can stabilize the region and promote 
economic growth. These effects can greatly improve the welfare of all people living in 
the region. Multilateral agreements, which obscure the identities of donors (Hattori, 
2001), could not produce the same utility in this example.  
The question then arises, is the best kind of aid for a particular situation always 
given? In other words, do the needs of recipients mainly dictate where and how aid is 
allocated around the globe? Unfortunately, the answer is a resounding “no.” A donor-
interest model has been shown time and again to describe aid-giving behavior much more 
accurately than a recipient-need model (Milner, 2006; Balogh, 1967; Vuong, 2003; 
Skidmore, 2012; Howard, 2010; Smith, 2008). Empirical evidence suggests that donors 
choose aid channels and recipients in a manner that furthers their own interests, not 
necessarily in a manner that improves the welfare of those most in need of aid. 
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A Donor-Interest Model of American Aid Giving 
When it comes to the United States, historical events suggest that donor-interests 
play a huge role in aid-giving behavior. For example, since the signing of the Egyptian-
Israeli peace treaty on the White House lawn in 1979, Egypt and Israel have received 
many times more aid from the United States than most of the poorest countries in the 
world. These aid agreements appear to serve as political leverage in calming tensions in 
the Middle East and, in the case of Egypt, as a tool to remove a potentially destructive 
player from an already unstable situation. In return for aid, the United States gets some 
measure of international political stability. 
Another great example of American leaders furthering national interests by using 
foreign aid is the case of Pakistan. Since 2002, Pakistan has received almost $20 billion 
USD in foreign aid from the United States, but instead of that aid being primarily focused 
on economic and infrastructural development, which Pakistan is desperately in need of, 
almost two-thirds of that aid has been directed into military projects. Ibrahim (2009) 
argues for 5 objectives of US foreign aid to Pakistan and the top two are “Covering the 
extra cost to Pakistan’s military of fighting terrorism” and “military equipment to fight 
terrorism.” (“Development and humanitarian assistance” was number 4.) Foreign aid to 
Pakistan spiked after September 11th, 2001 when the United States began to get militarily 
involved in Afghanistan and Iraq, which strongly suggests that this aid is being used to 
secure an ally in a region that is already extremely anti-American. The aid contract is also 
completely bilateral, with the United States enforcing conditionality (very poorly, so says 
Ibrahim) on Pakistan before aid is transferred. If the United States could not enforce 
conditionality, as would be the case in a multilateral arrangement, it is very likely that 
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Pakistan would receive much less aid since the US could not require that the aid be used 
to fight terrorism. However, it is not surprising that this arrangement is bilateral given 
that a “good deal of research suggests […] that bilateral aid is more tied to donor interests 
than is multilateral aid, which is often more needs-based in its orientation” (Milner, 2006: 
pg 109). In this case, the United States gets military support to help fight its own wars in 
return for aid. 
Foreign aid policy, as well as being a tool to influence the international 
environment, is also commonly a battleground for domestic issues. It can sometimes 
serve as a conduit for American cultural and social pressures to affect the rest of the 
world. For example, the Reagan administration initiated the Mexico City Policy, which 
mandated that foreign aid would not be given to any governments that fund abortion-
related activities (Petroni, 2008). This policy at face value already demonstrated clear 
socio-cultural pressures, but the political influences behind it came to light when every 
Democratic president since Reagan revoked the policy and every Republican reinstated it. 
(The act last went out of effect on January 23, 2009, three days after Barack Obama 
assumed the presidency.) The histories of the Mexico City Policy, the Israeli-Egyptian 
peace treaty, the US-Pakistan aid relationship and many other examples, clearly suggest 
that a donor-interest model best describes American aid giving behavior.  
In the past, the international environment has prompted the US to adopt specific 
aid-giving strategies to combat certain geopolitical foes, specifically the USSR in the 
Cold War. This was an instance of a change in aid policy caused by an exogenous source 
to the American political sphere, as opposed to an endogenous source, such as a dispute 
over abortion rights. The environment during the Cold War was ripe for a strong 
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American aid agenda, specifically a strong multilateral agenda, for a few key reasons: 1) 
the Western world perceived a common enemy in the USSR; 2) American military 
strength was considered the only feasible defense against a Russian nuclear attack; and, 
3) “[t]he US had also crafted Cold War international organizations to preserve US 
autonomy of action, and US allies only went along with this as long as they relied on 
American military supremacy to protect them from the USSR” (Skidmore, 2012: pg 44). 
As a result, average multilateral spending during the Cold War was notably higher than 
multilateral spending post-1991. Overall US aid giving also increased during the Cold 
War, but the ratio of multilateral aid to bilateral aid was significantly higher during that 
time than after 1991. (The next section will discuss how the Cold War was handled in 
data analysis)  
American foreign aid policy during the Cold War is a perfect example of “self-
interested multilateralism,” which Vuong (2003) describes as a nation strategically using 
multilateral agencies to further its own interests. However, without the Cold War 
conditions listed above, it would seem that bilateralism naturally lends itself to strategic 
considerations more than multilateralism. Aside from the recipient being fully aware of 
the donor’s identity, bilateralism also allows the donor to dictate all terms in the aid 
agreement (Milner, 2006; Balogh, 1967; Hattori, 2001). Multilateralism, on the other 
hand, naturally requires donors to sacrifice most of the strategic value of aid (Hattori, 
2001). In an international environment void of a common enemy that can only be 
defeated by one nation’s military strength, or a global problem that can only be solved 
through one nation’s leadership, bilateralism is a much more potent tool for donors in 
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furthering their own interests and reinforcing their symbolic domination over recipients 
(Milner, 2006; Hattori, 2001; Hattori, 2003). 
In the years since the Cold War ended, American multilateral practices have 
diminished because international conditions have changed drastically. Without a common 
enemy, other countries are now much less willing to tolerate American bullishness in 
international institutions, meaning that multilateralism now restrains American autonomy 
of choice much more than it did in the Cold War era (Milner, 2006). At home, Congress 
and the public are also less likely to support multilateralism because it is perceived to 
give more power to the president; this is a counter-intuitive dynamic identified by 
Skidmore (2012) that will be discussed in depth in a later section.  
Other scholars, such as Vuong (2003) and Howard (2010), have also suggested 
that military conflicts can have strong effects on aid giving. Howard argues that events 
like September 11th, 2001 or the Black Hawk Down incident in Somalia are perceived by 
the public to be policy failures of government leaders, and the government responds to 
these situations by moderating their policies. In the sphere of foreign aid, this dynamic 
causes strong multilateral or bilateral policy platforms to be moderated towards a more 
balanced approach. Despite coming into office touting a strong bilateral agenda, Howard 
writes, 9/11 had huge effects on the policies of the Bush administration and he ended up 
presiding over one of the strongest periods of American multilateralism since the Cold 
War. After Black Hawk Down in Somalia and the horrifying images of American soldiers 
being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, the Clinton government, which had 
assumed power promising an era of “assertive multilateralism,” moderated their policies 
towards the middle in response to public outrage. However, since these events are 
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somewhat short-lived, occur irrespective of the dominant party in power and are caused 
by factors exogenous to the United States, this paper makes no attempt to control for 
them and assumes they affect the aid policies of both parties equally over time. 
 
Policy Preferences of American Political Parties 
The other body of literature that this project rests on concerns the nature of 
political parties, specifically sources of policy preferences and their evolution over time. 
Objectively describing the nature of political parties can be very difficult and any attempt 
is extremely susceptible to bias due to the conflicting and very personal nature of political 
ideology. Disregarding domestic political ideology that has little bearing on foreign aid 
policy, the disposition of each party towards international involvement is most relevant to 
this project. By surveying partisan research, it is easy to gain a general impression of 
these dispositions.  
Milner (2006) writes that “parties on the left part of the political spectrum would 
be more interested in foreign aid” (pg 124) and also, while discussing party controls on 
her data, that she expects “that left governments have a greater propensity to give aid 
multilaterally” (pg 125). Milner & Tingley (2011) argue that “those holding conservative 
values should be more supportive of free trade and oppose [foreign] aid as a form of 
government intervention to redistribute wealth globally” (pg 48). Goldstein and Moss 
(2005) discuss US aid giving in Africa and state, “The popular perceptions are simply 
that Democrats care more than Republicans about [Africa]” (pg 1289). Fordham (1998) 
notes, “During the early Cold War era, liberals tended to favor the Truman 
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Administration's internationalist foreign policy, whereas conservatives tended to oppose 
it.”  
Digging deeper, the language used in the official platforms of each party can also 
help to illuminate their disposition towards international involvement. A section in the 
2012 GOP platform, titled “Sovereign American Leadership in International 
Organizations” begins by stating:  
“Since the end of World War II, the United States, through the founding of 
the United Nations and NATO, has participated in a wide range of 
international organizations which can, but sometimes do not, serve the 
cause of peace and prosperity. While acting through them, our country 
must always reserve the right to go its own way. There can be no 
substitute for principled American leadership.” (pg 45, emphasis added)  
While it cannot be said that this passage necessarily condemns international 
organizations, it certainly does not seem to advocate enthusiastic engagement with them. 
To make this even clearer, in the corresponding section from the 2012 Democratic 
platform, titled “Strengthening Alliances, Expanding Partnerships, and Reinvigorating 
International Institutions,” the very first sentences are these:  
The greatest dangers we face – terrorism, nuclear proliferation, cyber and 
biological attacks, climate change, and transnational crime – cannot be 
solved by any one nation alone. Addressing these challenges requires 
broad and effective global cooperation. And President Obama and the 
Democratic Party understand that this depends on close collaboration 
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with our traditional allies, cultivating partnerships with new centers of 
influence, and strong U.S. leadership within international institutions.” 
(pg 25, emphasis added) 
When these two passages are read side by side, it becomes obvious that, while 
both platforms depict the US as an indispensible leader in solving the world’s problems, 
the Republican platform is much less enthusiastic about international involvement. This 
difference is even more notable when considering that these passages mark the very first 
sentences of the sections they came from, thus setting the tone for the rest of the section 
detailing their preferences concerning international institutions. Language that is used in 
the rest of both platforms when talking about international involvement follows a very 
similar pattern. There is a consistent tone of caution in the Republican platform in 
discussions of international involvement that is far less noticeable or non-existent in the 
Democratic platform.  
These passages are just a few of millions of examples in partisan literature that 
reflect a long-standing ideological disagreement over how much American autonomy of 
choice should be sacrificed for the sake of international involvement. This disagreement 
is also as apparent in historical events as it is in literature.  
Over the beginning of the 20th century, Democratic president Woodrow Wilson 
pushed for his idea of a “League of Nations,” the first proposed institution aimed at a 
form of transcontinental governance and cooperation. However, a Republican-dominated 
US Congress rejected the idea and the League never gained the membership it needed to 
survive. The next big step in US foreign aid policy came after the Great Depression and 
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the horrors of WWII had passed when President Truman (D) gave his famous “Four 
Points” speech, in which he outlined foreign aid as a moral obligation of the United 
States. The next Democratic president, John F. Kennedy, changed US foreign aid policy 
forever by founding the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in 
1961. (USAID has become the primary agency, along with the State Department, for 
disbursing American foreign aid and the founding of USAID firmly established foreign 
aid as a permanent aspect of US foreign policy.) The intensification of the Cold War 
decreased the politicization of foreign aid in domestic American political discourse 
because party interests were aligned against a common enemy and aid was seen as a 
strategic tool with which to combat the Soviet Union (Skidmore, 2012). This alignment 
of interests culminated in an uncharacteristically strong aid agenda (specifically 
multilateral aid) under Republican president George H.W. Bush, who oversaw the fall of 
the USSR.  
As the Cold War has faded into memory, the tendencies of each party have 
become more pronounced once again. As mentioned above, President Clinton entered 
office promising an era of “assertive multilateralism,” and data from the first four years 
of his presidency show a steep and consistent rise in the ratio of multilateral aid to 
bilateral aid. After Clinton, Bush Jr. took office and many scholars (Skidmore, 2012; 
Vuong, 2003; Howard, 2010; Smith 2008) have remarked that his foreign policy was 
remarkably “unilateralist and isolationist” at first (Vuong, 2003: pg 804). Although 9/11 
may have pushed the Bush administration to shift its policies toward a more multilateral 
approach, as discussed above, there was also a 15% increase in the amount of foreign aid 
funneled through the Department of Defense from 2002 to 2005. Smith (2008) writes that 
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this was a clear indication of a “strong and growing link between U.S. aid programs and 
allocations and the administration's ‘global war on terror.’” This link grew even stronger 
in 2006 under a fully Republican controlled government when the United States provided 
$6.4 billion in aid, which represented about 30% of all American aid commitments, to 
Afghanistan and Iraq to support its military engagements (Furuoka, Munir, 2011). These 
last two examples are evidence that Republicans prefer to use aid more as a strategic tool 
than a development tool. (The administration’s disregard of the UN’s disapproval of an 
Iraqi invasion is also notable.)  
 
These approaches represent different strategies that lie along a spectrum of 
American foreign policy practices. (Figure 4 describes these practices as they relate to 
US-UN relations.) Howard (2010) observes that US foreign policy is never purely 
bilateral or multilateral, but always a blend of the two. However, examining the relative 
importance given to these strategies can help elucidate the foreign policy preferences of 
government officials. 
Figure 4; taken from Howard (2010) 
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Linking Party Ideology to Aid Policy Preferences 
Moving forward under the assumption that Democratic ideology favors an 
internationalist agenda and Republican ideology favors a nationalist agenda, we would 
expect to see very clear differences in the aid channels preferred by each party. 
Multilateralism, which naturally promotes an atmosphere of international cooperation, 
should be the logical preference for Democrats; on the other hand, the strategic value of 
bilateralism should attract Republican ideology, given the ways it can strengthen 
alliances and reinforce the symbolic domination of the United States over recipients in a 
more direct manner than multilateralism. 
Based on the concepts presented in this literature review, the fundamental 
question of this paper can thus be rephrased as follows:  
Given that both parties generally follow a donor-interest model of aid-
giving behavior, is there empirical proof that party ideology leads elected 
officials to prefer different aid channels? 
This paper seeks to identify partisan dispositions toward international 
involvement as they have manifested themselves in American aid giving practices over 
time. This Literature Review, while establishing the appropriate groundwork for this 
project, also make its clear, as Bobrow & Boyer remarked in 1996, that “there have been 
relatively few analyses that have sought to uncover the actual use of the aid tool across 
types of motives and categories of aid” (pg 96). This project seeks to contribute in this 
area of research. 
 
Whit Garling Partisan Influences on Foreign Aid Policy Spring, 2013 
 20 
Research Design 
To recap, the following analysis has been designed to test two hypotheses: 
1. Multilateral aid practices tend to increase under Democratic governments 
2. The foreign aid budget tends to increase under Democratic governments 
The dependent and independent variables implied by these hypotheses are 
American foreign aid policy and the influence of party ideology in US government, 
respectively. This project has conducted multiple comparative post-tests, where 
observations take place after the action and there is no control group, to see if changes in 
foreign aid policy can be explained by changes in the influence of party ideology.  Using 
multiple measures for both the independent and dependent variable allows for any 
outcome to be verified by different methods. Relationships between these variables have 
been tested using a basket of measures for both, which requires gathering historical data 
on both American foreign aid commitments and the influence of party ideology in 
government. 
 
Foreign Aid Policy Measures 
The relevant foreign aid data is available from the OECD’s statistical database. 
To briefly elaborate, the OECD catalogs ODA commitments and disbursements for the 
24 donor countries in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and differentiates 
aid flows between multilateral and bilateral channels. These data detail what amount of 
aid was put aside in donor budgets in a certain year (commitments), what donors actually 
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gave in a certain year (disbursements), how that aid was given (multilateral vs. bilateral) 
and where the money came from (public vs. private). For the purposes of this project, 
OECD commitment data that focuses on public aid giving is most useful. Commitment 
data is preferable over disbursement data for this project because commitment amounts 
only reflect the totals agreed upon in Congressional budget negotiations, whereas 
disbursement amounts are subject to conditions within the recipient country and a variety 
of other factors exogenous to the United States. The data detail yearly commitments from 
1966 to 2011. Private aid giving data have been excluded because private donations occur 
outside the sphere of government. 
Foreign aid policy can be analyzed using interval measures that gives the total aid 
budget amount (TotalAid), amounts of bilateral/multilateral aid commitments in a certain 
year (BiAid, MultiAid), as well as considering these numbers in the context of the entire 
budget (TotalBudget). Certain ratio measures can also lend relevant insight to foreign aid 
policy. The ratio of multilateral spending to bilateral spending (MultiBiRatio) can help 
illuminate the relative importance given to each strategy by governments. The ratio of the 
aid budget to the total budget (AidBudgRatio) is also useful for demonstrating the 
importance of aid as a whole, in the context of all government expenditures. Finally, 
analyzing the ratios of multilateral and bilateral commitments to the entire budget 
(MultPercBudg, BiPercBudg) can further illuminate policy preferences of the 
government in a specific year.  
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Party Influence Measures 
Since the US government is a very complicated organization, this project has 
broken it down into the component branches, comprised of elected officials that 
formulate aid policy: the president, the Senate, and the House of Representatives. 
Historical data detailing the party affiliation of American presidents and the balance of 
party in both chambers of Congress is vital information when examining which party 
ideology has the most influence in a given year. 
The variable used in this analysis to describe the party affiliation of the president 
in a certain year (PartyPresident) assigns a value of 0 for a Republican president and 1 for 
a Democratic president.  
Conceiving an appropriate set of measures to describe the influence of party 
ideology in Congress requires a slightly more nuanced approach, and in this case it is best 
to use the ratio of seats held by Democrats to Republicans in each house (SenateRatio, 
HouseRatio). The plain number of seats held by each party in each chamber would be 
unhelpful because these measures would quickly become unwieldy when dealing with 
hundreds of legislators, and also because the number of legislators in Congress has 
changed since the 1960s. Instead, Congressional ratio measures are most useful in 
showing the balance of partisan influence because the ratio unit is Democratic legislator 
per Republican legislator, which solves both issues stated above. Also, since we know 
that these two chambers do not exist in vacuums separate from one another and certainly 
have effects on each other, another variable might be helpful in assigning a value to the 
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partisan ideology of Congress as a whole in a certain year, which is the average of the 
two ratios just described (AvgHouseSenateRatio).  
The necessary data needed to create these measures is available on a variety of US 
government websites (whitehouse.gov, senate.gov, house.gov). 
 
Controls 
These measures are not sufficient means for testing the proposed hypotheses 
without controlling for a variety of other factors. Certain economic and social indicators, 
international events, as well as temporal adjustments, must be taken into account in order 
to rule out major threats to the validity of any empirical findings.  
As discussed above, the international environment during the Cold War 
significantly affected American foreign aid practices. A dummy variable (ColdWar), 
which gives a value of 1 for any year during the Cold War (1991 and before) and a value 
of 0 for any year after, is helpful in controlling for any policy adjustments caused by 
conflict with the USSR. 
Recalling that “foreign aid is a voluntary practice of donor states, whereas welfare 
is a right of citizens” (Hattori, 2001, pg 636), we know that foreign aid is not a top 
priority of government leaders. Since economic health has massive affects on government 
expenditures, it is also prudent to control for economic conditions that may affect foreign 
aid commitments. This project compensates for these conditions by controlling for a 
variety of economic indicators. First, yearly GDP totals for the US (GDP) have been 
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integrated into the dataset and controlling for this indicator should minimize the effects 
that national economic wellbeing in a particular year may have on aid giving. In tandem 
with GDP, a slightly more nuanced economic control has been created that derives its 
numerical value from the difference in GDP from the previous year to the current budget 
year (DiffGDP). Controlling for this variable should help to minimize the effects on aid 
giving policy that result from legislators reacting to short-term economic trends.  
Two other economic indicators included in the dataset are the United States’ 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) and inflation rate (InflationRate) for every year since 1966. 
Given that aid is a low priority for legislators, it is logical that the fluctuating power of 
the dollar over time would affect aid allocations since legislators prioritize the welfare of 
citizens over aid policy; controlling for these indicators (CPI, InflationRate) minimizes 
whatever effects those conditions have on aid policy. The final economic indicator 
included in this analysis is the unemployment percentage (Unemployperc), under the 
logic that a high unemployment percentage will result in decreased foreign aid allocations 
no matter what ideology has the most influence over government policies. 
As discussed in the Literature Review, the social environment within a country 
can also have a profound affect on government policy. For this project, a social indicator 
developed by the Manifestos Project is used to control for political polarization (Gabel, 
Huber, 2000). The Manifestos Project has developed a methodology for giving a score to 
party ideology on a scale from -100 (very liberal) to 100 (very conservative). Their 
database gives historical values for both parties at intervals of 2 to 4 years back to the 
1940s. (Interim values have been calculated using linear extrapolation.) However, instead 
of using the actual scores for Democrats and Republicans, this project makes use of the 
Whit Garling Partisan Influences on Foreign Aid Policy Spring, 2013 
 25 
difference in the two scores (DiffMRG), as a way of assigning a value to the amount of 
partisan polarization in a given year. A high DiffMRG value implies a highly polarized 
year in US politics, which (as recent events have frustratingly proven) greatly hampers 
the productivity of government and can have deep affects on policy, especially in low 
priority spending areas such as aid; a low DiffMRG value, on the other hand, indicates a 
year with relatively low levels of polarization between the two parties. 
 
Temporal Adjustments to Measures and Controls 
There were still more intricacies that had to be addressed before regression 
analysis could begin. In particular, a few temporal adjustments to the data were necessary 
so that the appropriate factors contributing to a foreign aid commitment in a given year 
lined up correctly. To explain the adjustments made to the PartyPresident variable, all 
Congressional variables and the economic controls, the foreign aid budget process must 
first be briefly outlined.  
Foreign aid budget requests for a certain fiscal year are initiated almost two years 
before that fiscal year begins, and are formulated by the different agencies in charge of 
foreign aid disbursal. (OECD data on US foreign aid commitments reflect the budgets of 
the State Department and USAID.) The President appoints all heads of major government 
agencies that manage the formulation of these and all other budget requests. Once the 
requests (collectively known as the “President’s Mark”) are compiled, the agencies send 
them to the President, who then submits the overall budget request to Congress. From 
there, the budget proposal goes through the usual process of editing, deal making and 
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tweaking by legislators until each chamber of Congress eventually votes to implement a 
revised budget, a motion which can only be overridden by a presidential veto. Most 
importantly, the Congress in a particular fiscal year votes on the budget for the next fiscal 
year.  
With this process in mind, the party of the president variable (PartyPresident) 
variable and all Congressional variables (SenateRatio, HouseRatio, 
AvgHouseSenateRatio) have been adjusted forward by two years and one year, 
respectively. While the reason for adjusting the Congressional variables forward by one 
year is fairly obvious, the reason for adjusting the party of the president variable 
(PartyPresident) by two years is less apparent. Milner and Tingley (2011) argue that 
presidents are very unlikely to veto a foreign aid billed passed by the legislature. Since 
aid is a matter of charity, they write, the president would have a hard time justifying why 
he, one person, opposed the charitable opinion of the legislative majority, which 
represents tax-paying constituents who actually provide the funds for foreign aid. In other 
matters, such as domestic fiscal policy, the president would have more leverage and 
credibility with which to justify a veto to his political opponents. Because of this 
dynamic, the president’s influence in determining the amount and type of aid seems to 
reside primarily in his appointment of agency heads in charge of foreign aid requests, not 
in Congressional negotiations. Since agencies begin the request process two years prior to 
a fiscal year, the president that appointed the heads of those agencies would have more 
influence over the foreign aid budget two years later than whoever is president when that 
budget was ratified or when it goes into effect.  
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Temporal adjustments were also necessary for the economic controls included in 
the dataset. Since the economy is such a massive and multifaceted animal, it takes a long 
time for the firms and agencies that monitor economic health to tabulate things like GDP, 
unemployment percentage, inflation rate and CPI, and then share that information with 
lawmakers. Generally, these numbers for a given year aren’t available until the next year. 
This means that lawmakers’ fiscal decisions are almost always based on the previous 
year’s economic data, which is why all economic indicators used in the analysis have 
been adjusted forward by one year. For example, the GDP value listed for 1990 in the 
dataset would actually be the GDP of 1989 because the 1990 budget was passed, in part, 
as a reaction to the economic growth in 1989. 
No temporal adjustments were made to the social indicator (DiffMRG), since 
party polarization affects government proceedings in real time, not ex post facto like 
economic health data. 
 
What Relationships Are Expected? 
The hypotheses put forth in this paper are meant to identify a causal relationship 
between the influence of party ideology and the manner of aid giving practiced by the 
United States government. If the following relationships between the independent and 
dependent variable measures are found through regression analysis, then there is strong 
empirical evidence to support these hypotheses.  
Positive relationships between the independent variable measures (PartyPresident, 
SenateRatio, HouseRatio and AvgHouseSenateRatio) and the multilateral variables 
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(MultiAid, MultiBiRatio, MultPercBudg) would support hypothesis #1 since they would 
suggest that multilateral practices increase as Democratic ideology has more influence on 
aid policy. Negative relationships between the independent variable measures and the 
bilateral variables (BiAid, BiPercBudg) would also provide secondary support for this 
hypothesis since they would suggest that Republicans governments are linked to higher 
levels of bilateralism. 
Positive relationships between the independent variable measures and the aid 
budget variables (TotalAid, AidBudgRatio) would lend support to hypothesis #2 because 
they would suggest that the aid budget grows as Democratic ideology has more influence 
on aid policy.  
The absence of any significant relationships between any of these measures would 
support the null hypothesis, which states that party ideology has no effect on aid policy. 
 
*     *     * 
 
Data Presentation 
These relationships have been tested using bivariate regression analysis, while 
controlling for the range of economic and social indicators previously described. The 
results are as follows: 
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Hypothesis #1: Multilateral aid practices tend to increase under Democratic 
governments 
PartyPresident 
The results indicate that the party of the president variable (PartyPresident) has a 
positive relationship with multilateral tendencies in foreign aid policy, though not exactly 
in the ways expected.  
The most relevant relationship to hypothesis #1 that was identified with the party 
of the president variable (PartyPresident) is with the aid-type-ratio variable 
(MultiBiRatio). This positive relationship lends direct support to hypothesis #1, because 
it suggests that multilateral spending as a percentage of the aid budget tends to increase 
under Democratic presidents. This finding for the party of the president variable 
(PartyPresident) is buttressed by the relationships with the multilateral variables 
(MultiAid, MultPercBudg). Although these two variables did not have a statistically 
significant (T-value > 2) relationship with the party of the president variable 
(PartyPresident), they both had T-values greater than 1 and they both had positive 
coefficients. This repeated result gives credence to the idea that multilateral aid practices 
(as measured in real dollar amounts and as a percentage of the total budget) tend to be 
higher under Democratic presidents. Alone, these relationships could not be given much 
credence since they lack statistical significance, but with the support of a strong 
relationship between the party of the president variable (PartyPresident) and the aid-type-
ratio variable (MultiBiRatio), they can be fairly considered pieces of supporting evidence 
to hypothesis #1.  
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The most statistically significant relationship (as judged by T-values) is a negative 
relationship with the total bilateral variable (BiAid), with a T-value of -4.19. The next 
most significant relationship was another negative relationship with the bilateral ratio 
variable (BiPercBudg) with a T-value of -2.95. These relationships indicate that the 
importance of bilateral aid practices (as measured in terms of real dollar amounts and as a 
percentage of the total budget) tends to be less under Democratic presidents. These 
relationships only lend secondary support to hypothesis #1 since they suggest lower 
levels of bilateralism under Democratic presidents, instead of higher levels of 
multilateralism. 
Overall, the results for the party of the president variable (PartyPresident) lend 
moderate to strong support for hypothesis #1. 
 
SenateRatio 
The different relationships found between the Senate variable (SenateRatio) and 
the basket of foreign aid policy measures were both expected and surprising. As predicted 
by hypothesis #1, significant and positive relationships exist between the Senate variable 
(SenateRatio) and the multilateral variables (MultiAid, MultPercBudg) with T-values of 
2.02 and 2.03, respectively. These relationships suggest that multilateral aid practices (as 
measured in real dollar amounts and as a percentage of the total budget) tend to increase 
as the ratio of Democrats to Republicans in the Senate increases, which is strong support 
for hypothesis #1. The Senate variable (SenateRatio) also demonstrated a positive 
relationship with the aid-type-ratio (MultiBiRatio) and, although the T-value for this 
Whit Garling Partisan Influences on Foreign Aid Policy Spring, 2013 
 31 
relationship was not significant, this lends weak support (by virtue of a repeated result in 
the House) to hypothesis #1 since it implies that multilateral spending, as compared to 
bilateral spending, tends to increase as Democratic ideology has more influence in the 
Senate. 
As well as demonstrating positive relationships with multilateral tendencies, the 
Senate variable (SenateRatio) also had statistically significant, positive relationships with 
the bilateral variables (BiAid and BiPercBudg) with T-values of 2.77 and 2.05, 
respectively. These relationships suggest that bilateral aid practices (as measured in real 
dollar amounts and as a percentage of the budget) also tend to increase as the Senate 
becomes more influenced by Democratic ideology. These relationships do not necessarily 
conflict with hypothesis #1, but they lend no direct support to its contention. Overall, the 
results for the Senate variable (SenateRatio) lend strong support to hypothesis #1. 
 
HouseRatio 
The relationships identified between the House variable (HouseRatio) and the 
basket of foreign aid policy measures were very similar to those found for the Senate 
variable (SenateRatio). The House variable (HouseRatio) also demonstrated significant 
relationships with the multilateral variables (MultiAid, MultPercBudg), indicating that 
multilateral tendencies (as measured in real dollar amounts and as a percentage of the 
budget) tend to increase as Democratic ideology has a larger influence in the House of 
Representatives, much like in the Senate. The House variable (HouseRatio) also showed 
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a positive, but insignificant relationship with the aid-type-ratio variable (MultiBiRatio), 
just like the Senate variable (SenateRatio).  
The only other significant relationship found with the House variable 
(HouseRatio) is with the bilateral ratio variable (BiPercBudg), and it is buttressed by an 
almost significant relationship with the total bilateral variable (BiAid). These 
relationships continue to mirror the relationships found for the variable, SenateRatio. 
Overall, these results lend strong support to hypothesis #1. 
 
AvgHouseSenateRatio 
As is to be expected, the relationships found for the average ideology variable, 
(AvgHouseSenateRatio) are extremely similar to the relationships for each of the 
variables (HouseRatio, SenateRatio) used to compute its value. This variable 
demonstrated significant positive, relationships with the multilateral aid, multilateral ratio 
and bilateral ratio variables (MultiAid, MultPercBudg, BiPercBudg), as well as 
insignificant, but positive relationships with the total bilateral aid variable and the aid-
type-ratio variable (BiAid, MultiBiRatio). The consistency of these relationships lends 
credibility to their implications and gives strong support for hypothesis #1. 
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Hypothesis #2: The foreign aid budget tends to increase under Democratic governments. 
PartyPresident 
Regression analysis produced some interesting and unexpected results for this 
variable. The relationships between the party of the president variable (PartyPresident) 
and the aid budget variables (TotalAid, AidBudgRatio) were both negative and 
significant. The relationship between the party of the president variable (PartyPresident) 
and the total aid variable (TotalAid) had a very strong T-value of -3.72, which suggests 
that aid commitments in real dollar amounts tend to be lower on average under 
Democratic presidents. The other significant relationship, which had a T-value of -2.27, 
was with the aid ratio variable (AidBudgRatio) and it suggests that the foreign aid budget 
as a percentage of the total budget tends to decrease under Democratic presidents. These 
two relationships imply that, at least in terms of the presidency, Democratic ideology is 
linked to a smaller aid budget, which directly disagrees with hypothesis #2. 
 
SenateRatio 
The Senate variable (SenateRatio) demonstrates a significant and positive 
relationship with the total aid variable (TotalAid). This relationship suggests that the aid 
budget, as measured in dollar amounts, tends to increase as Democratic ideology has 
more influence in the Senate and it lends strong support to hypothesis #2.  
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There was also a significant and positive relationship with the aid ratio variable 
(AidBudgRatio). This finding reinforces the idea that foreign aid expenditures increase 
under Democratic Senates and supports hypothesis #2. 
 
HouseRatio 
As with hypothesis #1, the relationships demonstrated by the House variable, 
(HouseRatio) closely mirror those found for the Senate variable (SenateRatio). 
Significant relationships with the aid budget variables (TotalAid, AidBudgRatio) suggest 
that the same dynamic exists in the House of Representatives as in the Senate. These 
relationships indicate that the aid budget (as measured in dollar amounts and as a 
percentage of the total budget) increases as Democrats control more seats in the House 
and they give strong support to hypothesis #2. 
 
AvgHouseSenateRatio 
Not surprisingly, relationships with the average-ideology variable 
(AvgHouseSenateRatio) once again mirrored the relationships found for the 
Congressional variables (HouseRatio, SenateRatio). Regression analysis identified 
positive and significant relationships between the average-ideology variable, 
(AvgHouseSenateRatio) and the aid budget variables (TotalAid, AidBudgRatio). 
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Threats to Validity 
There exist some minor, but legitimate threats to the validity of the findings 
presented in this section that are not addressed by the various controls integrated into the 
analysis. The main threat concerns the relationships that describe presidential aid 
behavior. Since the party makeup of Congress changes every two years and the president 
only changes every four (at least) there exists the danger that data used on presidential aid 
giving behavior is insufficient because it only describes the influence of 8 presidents in 
full, plus one year of President Obama’s influence (1966 – 2011). Without a larger pool 
of observations, it is possible that the relationships found with the party of the president 
variable (PartyPresident) are simply coincidence or stem from a third source. However, 
since aid behavior is measured in this project by year instead of presidency, there are 18 
observations for Democratic presidents and 28 observations for Republican presidents, 
which gives more credibility to the results.  
Other threats to validity are the numerous instances of American military 
involvement around the world. While this project does control for the Cold War, which 
had long-term and easily observable effects on aid policy even though it never developed 
into armed conflict, it does not control for other conflicts such as the Vietnam War, the 
Gulf War, or the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Only by closely studying the political 
environment in the United States and abroad during those periods would someone be able 
to fully understand how the differing natures of those conflicts may have incentivized 
certain aid policies. It is possible that instances of one party’s ideology having more 
influence in government coincidentally line up with certain situations that naturally call 
for bilateralism or multilateralism, which could skew the results into suggesting false 
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significance. While this is a legitimate threat to validity, the sheer number of military 
conflicts involving the US somewhat normalizes the problem across time and different 
ideologies.  
 
*     *     * 
 
Discussion 
Now that these relationships have been identified using statistical analysis, the 
next step is identifying what real world mechanisms they describe. The best way to 
achieve this is to break down the term “government,” which is used in both hypotheses, 
into smaller units of Congress and the president, and then seeing how well the hypotheses 
of this paper stand up in each branch. This section will discuss how the statistical 
relationships identified in the previous section manifest themselves in the real world and 
also if those relationships lend credence to hypothesis #1 (Multilateral aid practices tend 
to increase under Democratic governments), hypothesis #2 (The total aid budget will 
increase under Democratic governments), or both. 
 
Congressional Aid Giving Behavior  
The data strongly suggests that commitments of both types of aid, multilateral and 
bilateral, increase as Democrats control more seats in the Senate. There is also a strong 
positive relationship between Democrats in the House of Representatives and higher 
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levels of multilateral aid, as well as a very-close-to significant relationship with 
Democrats in the House and higher levels of bilateral aid. This finding certainly supports 
hypothesis #1, but it is rather unsatisfying support by itself, since it was expected that 
bilateral practices would decrease as multilateral practices increase when Congress was 
more influenced by Democratic ideology. However, this Democratic preference for 
multilateralism does seem to exist, according to the data, although in a subtle manner. 
While both types of aid-giving practices increase under Democratic Congresses, 
relationships between the Congressional variables (SenateRatio, HouseRatio) and the aid-
type-ratio variable (MultiBiRatio) suggest that multilateral commitments tend to increase 
at a faster rate than bilateral commitments as Democrats control more of Congress. 
Although neither of these two relationships had a significant T-value, they both had a 
positive T-value over 1. This repeated result in both the House and Senate, while not 
significant individually, makes a fairly strong suggestion that Congressional Democrats 
do indeed prefer multilateral aid giving, and gives credence that hypothesis #1 accurately 
describes aid-giving behavior in Congress. 
This finding, that Democrats increase all forms of aid, contributes to the 
impression widely held by Americans that Democrats are more likely to engage the 
international community, whereas Republicans usually prefer a more nationalist 
approach. While the relationships just described concerning the aid-type-ratio variable 
(MultiBiRatio) do show a preference between bilateralism and multilateralism for each 
party, the fact that both types of aid increase under Democrats and decrease under 
Republicans perhaps suggests that aid-giving policy preferences in Congress are 
secondary to each party’s general disposition concerning foreign aid. Congressional 
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Democrats can be said to generally “like” aid more than Republicans, based on these 
relationships. The primary issue concerning foreign aid for Congress appears not to be 
what method of giving is best for strengthening American symbolic domination, but 
whether or not foreign aid is a good thing to begin with. If one party tends to increase all 
types of aid and the other party decreases all types of aid, then there is clearly a 
disagreement over the value of foreign aid policy in the larger context of US politics.  
One explanation for why this might be is that partisan policy preferences are 
simplified in Congress because members of a party must aggregate their efforts to 
achieve their goals, unlike the president, for instance, who operates far more 
autonomously than any one Congressman. While there does seem to be some 
disagreement among the two parties in Congress over the best method of aid giving, the 
fact that numerous members of each party have to work together to achieve partisan goals 
may cause the debate over foreign aid to shift to a more fundamental question of “yes or 
no,” instead of debating the more complicated question: “What is the best way to give 
aid?” By simplifying the argument, each party has an easier time conveying a consistent 
message to other legislators and the general public. Justifying a preference for 
bilateralism or multilateralism is more difficult because each strategy is best suited for 
many specific situations and neither strategy can be said to always be the best aid giving 
strategy, as discussed in the Literature Review. 
While data on Congressional behavior does lend support to hypothesis #1, it also 
gives very intriguing insight into how the mechanics of Congress may affect policy 
debates and preferences. 
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Data on Congressional behavior also lends very strong support for hypothesis #2. 
The total aid budget, as well as the ratio of the aid budget to the total budget, has a very 
strong positive relationship with the number of Democrats in Congress and, given the 
simplification of the debate over foreign aid in Congress just described, this result is not 
surprising. Moreover, it is consistent with the empirical relationships relating to 
hypothesis #1. If Democrats increase all types of aid, then the total aid budget should 
certainly increase as well. In the sphere of Congress, it appears that both hypotheses are 
observed in the real world and they should be given greater credence given the way in 
which the results for each individual hypothesis complement the other. 
 
Presidential Aid Giving Behavior 
The president, as was briefly mentioned above, occupies a very different position 
in the sphere of American politics than any Congressman. There are many pressures and 
influences that affect the president, but not Congress, because he is considered the head 
of the United States government; the position receives more attention from the world, the 
American public, the media and other government officials than any other public figure. 
Given that these conditions specific to the presidency exist, it is therefore not surprising 
that the foreign aid behavior of the president suggested by this analysis is much different 
than that of Congress.  
The data suggests that preferences between multilateralism and bilateralism play a 
much bigger role in presidential aid policy than Congressional aid policy. While there 
were no significant relationships between the party of the president and the amount of 
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multilateral giving, there was an extremely strong relationship with the amount of 
bilateral giving. According to the data, average bilateral aid spending is lower under 
Democratic presidents and higher under Republican presidents; this finding is also 
buttressed by a strong, negative relationship with Democratic presidents and the ratio of 
bilateral spending to the total budget. These findings are certainly in line with what is to 
be expected if hypothesis #1 were true, but they do not support that contention by 
themselves. However, there is also a significant relationship between Democratic 
presidents and a higher ratio of multilateral aid to bilateral aid, which is direct support for 
hypothesis #1 and also is mathematically consistent with the relationship to bilateral aid. 
To summarize, Democratic presidents are associated with lower levels of bilateralism 
(resulting in a higher ratio of multilateral commitments to bilateral commitments) and 
lower levels of aid as a whole; there is also no significant association between the party 
affiliation of the president and multilateral commitment amounts. 
Moving forward on the assumption that Democrats do prefer multilateralism 
(since there is no direct disagreement in the results as they relate to the president but there 
is support in Congressional behavior), Democratic presidents, it seems, choose to show 
their preference for multilateralism by decreasing the status quo amount of bilateralism. 
If hypothesis #1 is accurate, it is possible that Democratic presidents attempt to reduce 
bilateral aid commitments to make room in the budget for Democratic Congressmen to 
push for higher multilateral commitments, as a way for Democratic Party members to 
collectively achieve a multilateral agenda.  
However, the data only weakly suggests, by virtue of a repeated result, that 
Democratic presidents are associated with higher levels of multilateral aid. This 
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suggestion springs from two non-significant, but consistently positive relationships 
between the party of the president variable (PartyPresident) and the multilateral variables 
(MultiAid, MultPercBudg). Even though these weak relationships may give some support 
to hypothesis #1, they also make it clear that presidents either don’t have much influence 
over multilateral practices or they actively avoid multilateral aid policy. Since the former 
is very unlikely to be true given the power of the president (especially in international 
affairs), the latter statement should be explored.  
The question then becomes, what would cause presidents (but not Congressmen) 
of both parties to largely avoid meddling with multilateral aid practices? There is clearly 
a relationship between the party affiliation of the president and the amount of bilateral 
spending, so why not multilateral spending? Skidmore (2012) offers a very compelling 
answer to this question. He argues that Congress and the public perceive that multilateral 
aid practices give more power to the president because the purview of Congress is almost 
completely domestic, whereas a huge part of the president’s duties involve international 
diplomacy. Since multilateralism is facilitated through international organizations, the 
process is seen to expand the duty of the president. Skidmore writes that this dynamic is 
one reason why multilateral practices increased during the Cold War when domestic 
interests were aligned against a common enemy and then dropped off after the fall of the 
USSR because there was less need for strong presidential leadership. 
Accepting this explanation, it is therefore not surprising that presidents tend to 
avoid multilateral aid policy altogether since they might be seen as trying to change the 
quality of power they hold. The weak, but consistently positive relationships between 
Democratic presidents and multilateral aid practices suggest that there is still some room 
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for the commander-in-chief to exercise influence over multilateral aid policy without 
backlash, but the results make it clear that the main action takes place over bilateral aid 
policy. The unexpected social condition identified by Skidmore (2012) helps to make 
sense of these results as they relate to hypothesis #1: Republican presidents directly show 
their preference for bilateralism by increasing bilateral commitments; Democratic 
presidents indirectly show their preference for multilateralism by decreasing bilateral 
commitments, since advancing a strong multilateral aid policy may carry too large of a 
political risk.  
This interpretation of presidential foreign aid behavior using the concepts outlined 
by Skidmore (2012) lends strong support to hypothesis #1, albeit in a somewhat 
“backdoor” manner. 
According to the data, hypothesis #2 fails to describe presidential behavior 
concerning the total aid budget, and it seems that the opposite dynamic (lower average 
aid budgets under Democratic presidents) is observed in the real world. This result 
reaffirms the findings of Goldstein & Moss (2005). This conclusion marks a departure in 
aid behavior between Democratic presidents and Democratic Congressmen, since the 
foreign aid budget tends to increase when Democrats have more control over Congress. 
However, given the concept provided by Skidmore (2012) just discussed, this finding is 
not surprising. If presidents more or less leave multilateral aid policy to Congress and 
only attempt to affect bilateral policy, then a Democratic president who seeks to reduce 
bilateral aid will logically also reduce the entire foreign aid budget, ceteris paribus. 
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The extremely strong support for hypothesis #2 in Congressional aid policy 
behavior demands that the contention be given some credence, but in this instance it 
seems that hypothesis #2 fails to describe presidential behavior due to an unexpected 
social condition. Also, the strong tendency of presidents to affect bilateral commitments 
clearly suggests the presence of an ideological disagreement over aid policy. In future 
research, a tendency among Democratic presidents to favor multilateral aid giving might 
be flushed out by doing a similar regression analysis, but controlling for factors such as 
the presidential approval rating – factors that could influence a president’s willingness to 
take political risks. The controls used for this project were designed to account for 
conditions that affect the policy decisions of all government officials, such as economic 
health or partisan polarization. While these controls may correct for some irregularities in 
presidential aid policy behavior, they fail to take into account all of the pressures 
particular to the presidency. This realization makes it clear that the term “government” 
was a rather clumsy unit of analysis in identifying the effects of partisan ideology on aid 
policy; a research design that accounts for how Congress and the president are differently 
situated in the American political system might reveal support for hypothesis #2 that this 
project has missed.  
 
 
*     *     * 
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Conclusion 
This project has identified important differences in policy behavior between the 
president and Congress in the arena of foreign aid – differences that should be understood 
by any American voter who prioritizes foreign aid policy when evaluating political 
candidates. The results make it clear that party ideology, as it affects foreign aid policy, 
does play a role in determining the nature of aid commitments, but can be warped by 
influences specific to certain positions in government. The dynamic identified in this 
analysis implies that voters whose only goal is to promote foreign aid by electing pro-aid 
officials should always vote for Democratic Congressmen, but only for Democratic 
presidents if they really care about increasing the ratio of multilateral commitments to 
bilateral commitments, ceteris paribus. Otherwise, pro-aid voters should choose 
Republican presidents, who are linked to larger aid budgets. Armed with this knowledge, 
the American voter can better choose based on empirical knowledge, not just political 
instincts, officials whose foreign aid preferences most closely mirror their own.  
The hypotheses of this project initially sprang from political instincts and the 
subsequent analysis has shown that they only partially describe real world events, which 
indicates that party ideology can be greatly affected by unexpected and very subtle 
conditions. The differences in Congressional and presidential aid behavior suggest that 
there may be room for research into how party ideology manifests differently depending 
on the amount of power held by a position in government. Perhaps the specificity of 
policy preferences is positively related to power (the more powerful your position is, the 
more you can afford to promote a specific policy), which might account for why the 
foreign aid debate seems to be simplified in Congress and pointed in the Oval Office. At 
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any rate, the results make it clear that foreign aid is an extremely nuanced policy area in 
American government. Nothing in politics is black and white, but foreign aid strategy 
seems to be about as gray as you can get. This project has identified some key dynamics 
at play in foreign aid policy decisions and future endeavors in aid research can benefit 
from its successes and failures. 
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